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COMMENTS
THE PREEMPTION OF COLLECTIVE STATE
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Thirty years ago, cellphones were limited to executives and eccentrics; today, they are a linchpin of modern society. Telecommunications help people connect, access emergency services, and navigate cities, but may represent a high cost to consumers.1 In 2013,
T-Mobile branded itself the “Un-Carrier” and immediately began a
strategic and widespread disruption of the consumer telecommunications market.2 Over the last seven years, T-Mobile instituted
policies and campaigns to acquire market share from Verizon and
AT&T, the two largest mobile carriers. Looking to jumpstart 5G
technology and push the U.S. wireless infrastructure forward, TMobile decided to address its spectrum shortcomings by acquiring
Sprint Mobile.3 Sprint Mobile faced an uncertain future, with declining subscribers and revenue.4 Telecommunications play a central role in the daily lives of most U.S. citizens, and the economics
underlying the market determine the shape of that role. Before the
merger, T-Mobile and Sprint had a combined 127,166,000 customer base.5 Changes to the market and the services provided to

1. See generally Issue Brief: A Communications Oligopoly on Steroids, WASH. CTR. FOR
EQUITABLE GROWTH (July 31, 2017), https://equitablegrowth.org/issue-brief-a-communica
tions-oligopoly-on-steroid/ [https://perma.cc/47BQ-XTH9].
2. See Amended Complaint at 24, New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 439 F. Supp. 3d
179 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (No. 1:19-cv-5434).
3. T-Mobile Completes Merger with Sprint to Create the New T-Mobile, SPRINT (Apr. 1,
2020), https://newsroom.sprint.com/tmobile-completes-merger-with-sprint.htm [https://per
ma.cc/43UF-HNLU].
4. Deutsche Telekom, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 194.
5. As of December 31, 2017, T-Mobile had 72,585,000 customers and Sprint had
54,581,000 “subscribers.” T-Mobile U.S., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 6, 2020)
[hereinafter T-Mobile Annual Report], https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-00012
83699/bc54c43f-ee88-42d9-9393807ec361b545.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BZU-CW9W]; Sprint
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the existing customers of the new T-Mobile could drastically impact the welfare of a substantial number of consumers.
Federal and state antitrust differences came to a head in New
York v. Deutsche Telekom AG.6 On April 29, 2018, T-Mobile announced its intention to merge with Sprint.7 The firms submitted
the merger for review by federal agencies on July 18, 2018.8 Review
by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) followed.9 The DOJ and FCC reached
settlements with the merging companies on July 26, 2019, and October 16, 2019, respectively.10 Then, fourteen States’ Attorneys
General filed suit to block the merger, alleging concerns of raised
costs and decreased competition.11 The suit proceeded to trial, with
the district court reaching a verdict in favor of T-Mobile and
Sprint.12 Finally, on April 1, 2020, the merger closed.13 Despite the
closing of the merger, challenges continued with regulatory
pushback from the California Public Utilities Commission
(“CPUC”) and consumer litigation attempting to block the merger.14
Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Feb. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Sprint Quarterly Report],
https://sec.report/Document/0000101830-18000013/#s6D65CC3DBA5052A4987FD222502
6557E [https://perma.cc/J36L-WP4E].
6. See generally Deutsche Telekom, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 179.
7. T-Mobile and Sprint to Combine, Accelerating 5G Innovation & Increasing Competition, T-MOBILE (Apr. 29, 2018), https://www.t-mobile.com/news/5gforall [https://perma.cc/
R87V-XFYY].
8. Public Notice, FCC Establishes Pleading Cycle for T-Mobile/Sprint Transaction, 33
FCC Rcd. 6771 (2018).
9. Id.
10. Justice Department Settles with T-Mobile and Sprint in Their Proposed Merger by
Requiring a Package of Divestitures to Dish, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 26, 2019) [hereinafter
Justice Department Settles], https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-settles-t-mo
bile-and-sprint-their-proposed-merger-requiring-package [https://perma.cc/RW34-R9X7];
T-Mobile U.S., Inc., 34 FCC Rcd. 10,578 (2019).
11. Tali Arbel, State AGs Look to Head Off T-Mobile-Sprint Deal in Court, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Dec. 6, 2019), https://apnews.com/40684852c3b5a9f5d1564c6b97ca119d [https://per
ma.cc/V26V-HUZV].
12. New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 439 F. Supp. 3d 179, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
13. Edmund Lee, T-Mobile Closes Merger with Sprint, and a Wireless Giant is Born,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/01/business/media/tmobile-clo
ses-sprint-merger.html [https://perma.cc/Q8Q4-99YX]; Andrew Limbong, T-Mobile Completes Takeover of Rival Company Sprint, NPR (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/04/
01/825523250/t-mobile-completes-takeover-of-rival-company-sprint
[https://perma.cc/7R
CG-CVPJ].
14. See Jon Reid, T-Mobile, Sprint Pull Merger Request From California Regulator,
BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 31, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and-telecom-law/t-mob
ile-sprint-pull-merger-request-from-california-regulator
[https://perma.cc/8EJH-5XYS];
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The dichotomy between the levels of government provided
murky guidance to telecommunications firms on what behavior is
anticompetitive and what decisions firms will have to spend years
defending. Despite T-Mobile and Sprint agreeing to sell off several
subsidiaries, helping to create a new competitor, and surviving a
gamut of regulatory reviews, these companies still could not merge.
At this point, preventing the deal would cause irreversible harm to
the merging parties.
The conflicts that arose in the T-Mobile-Sprint merger could
have been solved through the preemption of collective state antitrust enforcement in the telecommunications market, which would
balance the twin goals of promoting the consumer and aggregate
social welfares. The telecommunications market is subject to substantial federal scrutiny and regulation, which limits competitive
choices to an abnormal degree and causes the market to suffer extraordinary damage when collective states interject themselves as
enforcers. Limiting state antitrust activities is not a novel concept,
with a variety of studies arguing that the inefficiencies and competing interests associated with state action substantially hamper
state antitrust enforcement of national markets.15 This Comment
does not presume to redefine the antitrust system in its entirety,
but narrowly applies the possibility of preempting state action to
the telecommunications market.
In Part I, this Comment will explore antitrust in the context of
the T-Mobile-Sprint merger, through the federal regulators’ enforcement actions and the lawsuit by the States’ Attorneys General. Part II will examine previous examples of rifts between state
and federal antitrust enforcers. Part III covers the evolving regulation in the telecommunications market, specifically highlighting

Khorri Atkinson, CWA, Consumers Drop Challenges to T-Mobile/Sprint Merger, LAW360
(Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1257577/cwa-consumers-drop-challenges
-to-t-mobile-sprint-merger [https://perma.cc/EL8J-XZAX].
15. See, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Democracy, 46 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
807, 829 (2019); Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Case for Federal Preemption in
Antitrust Enforcement, 18 ANTITRUST L.J. 79, 79 (2004) [hereinafter Hahn & Layne-Farrar,
Federal Preemption in Antitrust Enforcement]; Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, Federalism in Antitrust, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 877, 878 (2003) [hereinafter Hahn & LayneFarrar, Federalism in Antitrust]; Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 940 (2001); Robert H. Lande, When Should States Challenge Mergers:
A Proposed Federal/State Balance, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1047, 1047 (1990); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 39 (1975).
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the pervasiveness of the federal enforcement agencies and the continuing growth of the role of the Committee on Foreign Investment
in the United States (“CFIUS”) in the market. Part IV explores the
potential benefits and dangers of preempting collective state antitrust action in telecommunications.
I. ANTITRUST IN THE CONTEXT OF THE T-MOBILE-SPRINT MERGER
In Part I, this Comment examines mergers by generally exploring the antitrust law governing horizontal mergers and the application of that law to the events in the T-Mobile-Sprint merger. This
section explores the federal application of antitrust law, state enforcement through litigation, and the district court’s decision in the
T-Mobile-Sprint merger.
A. Mergers Generally
The Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts are the primary
sources of antitrust law, and their enactment granted federal regulators the power to enforce federal antitrust law.16 The Clayton
Act’s Section 7 governs mergers, due to their high potential to create anticompetitive effects; Section 7 bans the acquisition of a competitor if the result would be to “substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”17 The Sherman Act’s Section
2 prohibits monopolistic behavior and provides that “[e]very person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty . . . .”18 Additionally, the HartScott-Rodino Act requires companies to submit mergers above a
certain threshold to federal agencies for review.19 The Hart-ScottRodino Act applies to vertical and horizontal mergers.20 Federal

16. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7; Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–
27(a).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
18. Id. § 2.
19. Id. § 18(a) (“[N]o person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, any voting securities or
assets of any other person, unless both persons (or in the case of a tender offer, the acquiring
person) file notification pursuant to rules under subsection (d)(1) and the waiting period
described in subsection (b)(1) has expired . . . .”).
20. Id.

GROSSO 552 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

2/11/2021 10:24 AM

ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS

619

agencies, the States’ Attorneys General, and private actors may
enforce these three statutes.21
Mergers are reviewed for anticompetitive effects such as a dangerous concentration of the market and illegitimate restraints on
trade.22 Analysis of a merger’s anticompetitive effects is primarily
conducted under the Clayton Act’s Section 7.23 With a lack of case
law from the Supreme Court of the United States and the lower
courts since the 1980s, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and
DOJ merger guidelines serve as significant persuasive authority
for interpreting the federal standard.24 The merger review, conducted by agencies and courts, is forward-looking as it attempts to
predict effects on competition and the new market structure following the merger.25
The goals of antitrust enforcement generally fall into two philosophies: maximizing consumer welfare or maximizing the aggregate
social welfare.26 Both theories are focused on increasing surplus
with differing priorities for which surplus to prioritize.27 Consumer
welfare represents the economic surplus retained by consumers.28
The aggregate social welfare is the surplus retained by both consumers and producers.29 While the aggregate social welfare initially appears as a secondary concern for antitrust economics, it
plays a central role in measuring the continued growth of both mi-

21. The Enforcers, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws/enforcers [https://perma.cc/UHF3-YV5H].
22. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
23. Id.; New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 439 F. Supp. 3d 179, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
24. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 0.1 (1997) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES], https://www.just
ice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-0 [https://perma.cc/EM9Y-M4T5] (“The unifying
theme of the Guidelines is that mergers should not be permitted to create or enhance market
power or to facilitate its exercise. Market power to a seller is the ability profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant period of time.”).
25. Id. § 1.
26. See Alan J. Messe, The Goals of Antitrust: Reframing the (False?) Choice Between
Purchaser Welfare and Total Welfare, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2197, 2198–99 (2013) (using the
term “total” instead of aggregate).
27. See id. at 2219; see also Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Welfare Standards in
U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Enforcement, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2497, 2509 (2013) (“In this current populist formulation, it is consumer welfare that would be maximized at the expense
of producer-and-consumer welfare.”).
28. See Messe, supra note 26, at 2228.
29. See id. at 2229.
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cro- and macroeconomic markets. By prioritizing consumer welfare, regulatory and statutory enforcement may sacrifice the aggregate social welfare, and the inverse is also true. Further, these
twin goals must prevent restraints on trade while allowing competitors to grow and innovate.
Horizontal mergers—mergers between two competitors—are a
particular concern in antitrust because of the compounding effects
of removing a competitor and the surviving party’s resulting increase in market share.30 Mergers are permissible, however, if they
provide efficiencies that would be unobtainable without the combination of the companies.31
B. Federal Actions
The primary federal antitrust enforcement agencies are the DOJ
and FTC. If the federal antitrust agencies suspect a merger will
result in anticompetitive effects, then they may call for divestitures, issue consent decrees, engage in litigation to block mergers,
and conduct post-merger review.32 Divestitures and consent decrees may be combined, as seen in the DOJ approval of the T-Mobile-Sprint merger.33 Divestitures involve a negotiated settlement,
with the merging parties agreeing to sell off portions of their business to maintain premerger competition levels.34 Consent decrees
are helpful to competitors by allowing companies to make business
plans with clarity; this benefit, however, is eroded by enforcers that

30. 4 EARL W. KINTER, JOSEPH P. BAUER, WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 34.3 (2019) (“The following anticompetitive effects typically flow
from horizontal mergers: (1) the combined market share percentage of the merged enterprises will exceed that previously enjoyed by either of the two parties to the merger; (2) the
new firm will have larger assets; and (3) the number of competitors in the relevant market(s)
will be reduced by one.”).
31. See Alan A. Fisher, Frederick I. Johnson & Robert H. Lande, Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 777, 778 n.2 (1989) (“Economic efficiency occurs when
there is no way to reallocate resources or goods to make any individual better off without
making someone else worse off. Perfect competition in all markets ensures economic efficiency.” (emphasis omitted)).
32. See The Enforcers, supra note 21.
33. See generally Proposed Final Judgment at 6–11, United States v. Deutsche Telekom
AG, No. 1:19-cv-02232 (D.D.C. July 26, 2019).
34. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER
REMEDIES 7–10 (2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2011/06/17/27
2350.pdf [https://perma.cc/TF5U-9WWJ].
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do not stand by the terms of the decree.35 Consent decrees have
been used previously in telecommunications to reshape the market. Bell Telephone is the most salient example for our purposes.36
To combat the AT&T monopoly, the DOJ sued to break up the company and to reinvigorate competition in the industry.37 This DOJled litigation was resolved through a consent decree and resulted
in a complete remapping of the market.38 While an extreme example, it demonstrates the power of consent decrees as a regulatory
tool, particularly in telecommunications. This action resulted in a
complete restructuring of the market and provided evidence of the
overwhelming power available to the federal regulators.
After T-Mobile submitted the merger proposal for review, the
DOJ picked up the review and negotiated a divesture plan that
would lead to a consent decree from the agency.39 The DOJ’s proposed settlement involved T-Mobile and Sprint divesting Sprint’s
prepaid business, including Boost Mobile, Virgin Mobile, and
Sprint prepaid, to DISH Network Corp.40 Additionally, the parties
would divest spectrum, at least 20,000 cell sites, and hundreds of
retail locations to DISH.41 Also, T-Mobile would provide DISH with
access to the new combined T-Mobile network for seven years while
DISH would build its 5G network.42 The DOJ requested the divesture of the prepaid businesses to protect low-income users, addressing a primary concern later raised by the plaintiff states.43
The divestitures would result in (1) providing resources to stand

35. See Landes & Posner, supra note 15, at 39 (describing the monopoly on enforcement
necessary for enforcement).
36. Andrew Pollack, Bell System Breakup Opens Era of Great Expectations and Great
Concern, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 1984), https://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/01/us/bell-systembreakup-opens-era-of-great-expectations-and-great-concern.html [https://perma.cc/EZJ9-S
YV9]; Chain of Events Led to Bell Breakup with AM-Bell System Breakup, Bjt, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Dec. 10, 1988), https://apnews.com/d691cca8e5f4729842784cbd978824cc [https://per
ma.cc/RD7S-8WRW].
37. See Chain of Events Led to Bell Breakup with AM-Bell System Breakup, Bjt, supra
note 36.
38. Id.
39. Proposed Final Judgment, supra note 33, at 2–18.
40. Id. at 6–7.
41. Id. at 11–16.
42. Justice Department Settles, supra note 10.
43. Proposed Final Judgment, supra note 33, at 6–11; see Fourth Amended Complaint
at 9–10, United States v. Deutsche Telekom AG, No. 1:19-cv-02232 (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 2019).
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up a new competitor (DISH) and (2) removing control of the prepaid market from the combined entity.44 Following the divestitures, the DOJ’s stipulations resulted in a settlement and consent
decree blessing the merger.45
Following the DOJ settlement, the FCC published a memorandum approval, detailing the effects of the proposed merger and divestitures.46 The merger required FCC approval because of the
transfer of radio licenses from Sprint to T-Mobile, and FCC review
may consider impacts including and beyond competition.47 The
FCC’s provisions provided further assurance that T-Mobile would
meet the promised goals and also provided remedies for the federal
government if those goals did not come to pass: T-Mobile agreed to
pay $10 to $250 million if it failed to meet verifiable goals relating
to the implementation of the 5G network.48
C. State Action
The plaintiff states filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York seeking to permanently enjoin the merger.49 The action, led by the New York and California
Attorneys General, included ten states.50 Generally, state attorneys general may bring suits under the federal antitrust laws or
their respective state laws.51 Here, the states alleged violations of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, arguing that the merger would (1) decrease competition due to concentration of the market, (2) fail to
result in cognizable and merger-specific efficiencies, and (3) cause
44. Statement of Interest at 10–11, United States v. Deutsche Telekom AG, No. 1-19cv-5434 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2019).
45. Proposed Final Judgment, supra note 33, at 6–11.
46. See generally T-Mobile U.S., Inc., 34 FCC Rcd. 10,578, 10,583–84 (2019).
47. Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 5; see infra section III.A.
48. T-Mobile U.S., Inc., 34 FCC Rcd. 10,578, 10,583–84 (2019).
49. New York Attorney General James Moves to Block T-Mobile and Sprint Megamerger,
N.Y. ST. OFF. ATT’Y GEN. (June 11, 2019) [hereinafter Attorney General Moves to Block
Megamerger], https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/new-york-attorney-general-james-move
s-block-t-mobile-and-sprint-megamerger-0 [https://perma.cc/6PQR-MCS7].
50. Amended Complaint, supra note 2 (noting that plaintiffs included the states of New
York, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, and Wisconsin; the Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Virginia; and the
District of Columbia).
51. See Alec Koch, Carrie B. Mahan & John Woykovsky, Antitrust Violations, 33 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 511, 534–35 (1996) (discussing state antitrust laws and methods through
which states may enforce them).
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consumer harm through increased prices.52 Conversely, the defendants argued that the merger would result in (1) increased competition, (2) decreased prices, and (3) service of the public interest.53 The suit proceeded and the burden of analyzing the effects of
the merger on competition shifted to the district court.
The negotiated divestitures led the DOJ and FCC to bless the
merger. Despite federal approval, the collective plaintiff states
brought this action in opposition to the settlement.54 The DOJ opposed the plaintiff states’ suit through a Statement of Interest because of the risk to the negotiated settlement.55 In opposition to the
collective state suit, several states joined the DOJ’s Statement of
Interest to express support for the merger.56
In this context, the district court applied Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, which prohibits a merger if its effect “may be substantially to
lessen competition in any line of commerce in any section of the
country.”57 Substantial impairment of competition must be a reasonable probability, not a mere possibility.58 The likelihood of anticompetitive effects is determined with consideration of the “structure, history, and probable future” of the particular markets that
the merger will affect.59 Courts analyze transactions under “a totality-of-the-circumstances approach to the statute,”60 which
weighs “a variety of factors to determine the effects of particular
transactions on competition . . . Evidence of market concentration

52. Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 33; see Attorney General Moves to Block
Megamerger, supra note 49.
53. Defendants’ Pretrial Memorandum at 21–30, New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG,
439 F. Supp. 3d 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (No. 1:19-cv-5434), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23716.
54. See Attorney General Moves to Block Megamerger, supra note 49.
55. See generally Statement of Interest, supra note 44.
56. States joining the action included Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana,
Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Texas; states voicing public approval of the
settlement included Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah. Statement of Interest, supra note 44,
at 6.
57. Deutsche Telekom, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 198 (quoting United States v. Phila. Nat’l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 355 (1963)).
58. Id. (citing Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 351 (2d Cir. 1979)); see id. (“Section
7 ‘deals in probabilities, not ephemeral possibilities’” (quoting United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 622–23 (1974))).
59. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974) (quoting Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322 n.38 (1962)).
60. United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Section 7
analysis requires evaluation of a merger’s competitive effects under the totality of the circumstances. Id.
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simply provides a convenient starting point for a broader inquiry
into future competitiveness.”61 With this overarching standard in
mind, the court must analyze significant factors that may affect
competition, including the market shares of competitors, concentration of the market, barriers to entry, the possibility of collusion
in the market, and the motive for the merger.62
The states’ suit focused in large part on whether the transaction
would “significantly increase market concentration, thereby creating a presumption that the transaction is likely to substantially
lessen competition.”63 A merger is presumptively anticompetitive
if the merged firm would have a market share greater than thirty
percent64 or a market concentration (measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”)) that results in a “highly concentrated market.”65 The HHI is a market measurement tool used by
the FTC and DOJ.66 Market concentration analysis, conducted either through the HHI or percentage market shares, is not definitive in determining if a merger is anticompetitive.67 A court applying the HHI or measuring percentage market shares must then
turn to look at the “particular structure and circumstances of the
industry at issue.”68 As the court considered the parties’ arguments, it placed significant weight on “already extensive scrutiny

61. Id.; see also United States v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 981 (2d Cir. 1984)
(noting that “large market shares are a convenient proxy” but are not definitive for assessing
horizontal mergers).
62. This list is not exhaustive, and the importance of every factor is determined by the
specific facts surrounding the merger. See 1 JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI, PETER SULLIVAN
& MAUREEN MCGUIRL, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 30.03 (2d ed. 2020).
63. Deutsche Telekom, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 199 (quoting Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. N.V. v.
FTC, 534 F.3d 410, 423 (5th Cir. 2008)).
64. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364–66 (1962); Consol. Gold
Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 260 (2d Cir. 1989).
65. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, § 5.3. A merger is presumptively anticompetitive if it results in a “highly concentrated market” with an HHI above
2500. Deutsche Telekom, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 205–06.
66. Deutsche Telekom, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 206; HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra
note 24, § 5.3.
67. Deutsche Telekom, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 206. Here, the plaintiffs determined the market share resulting from the merger to be “either 37.8 percent if measured by subscribers or
34.4 percent if measured by revenues,” but the district court did not find this presumption
dispositive. Id.
68. Id. (quoting Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 411 (2004)).
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of the Proposed Merger by the FCC and DOJ,” due to the complexity in evaluating this market.69 To determine the merger’s competitive effects under the totality of the circumstances, the district
court incorporated the market shares, HHI, structure of the telecommunications market, and the scrutiny of the FCC and DOJ.70
1. Plaintiff States’ Argument
The three primary arguments made by the plaintiff states were
that the merger would result in decreased competition; prices
would be likely to increase; and that the argued efficiencies were
neither cognizable nor merger-specific.71 Decreased competition
would supposedly occur due to the reduction of three competitors
and would reduce incentives for T-Mobile to continue its “maverick” strategy.72 The supposed resulting efficiencies were said to be
speculative and able to be achieved without the merger.73 The merger was argued to be likely to result in increased prices due to the
decreased competition and increased opportunities to collude, resulting in disparate negative impacts for low-income consumers.74
The plaintiffs stated the merger would result in the consolidation of the third- and fourth-largest national mobile services providers, with the combined firm gaining the largest market share.75
Market consolidation, combined with high barriers to entry, represents a significant risk to competition; if prices are raised, new
competitors still may not be able to enter.76 The drop to three competitors would drastically change the market structure and market
shares.77 The states estimated the combined entity—the new TMobile—would have a market share higher than AT&T and Verizon.78 The plaintiff states believed this would decrease T-Mobile’s
69. Id.
70. See id. at 205–06, 224–25, 233–34, 239–244.
71. Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 16–18, 24–25, 29.
72. Id. at 24.
73. Id. at 29.
74. Id. at 4–5.
75. Id. at 3–4.
76. See generally KINTER ET AL., supra note 30, § 34.10 (describing barriers to entry).
77. Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 3–4.
78. Under the HHI analysis, the plaintiff states met a prima facie burden, with the
court stating that “New TMobile [sic] would have a national market share of either 37.8
percent if measured by subscribers or 34.4 percent if measured by revenues, and the national HHI would increase by 679 points for a total HHI of 3186.” New York v. Deutsche

GROSSO 552 (DO NOT DELETE)

626

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

2/11/2021 10:24 AM

[Vol. 55:615

incentives to continue its maverick behavior or to lower its prices.79
The DOJ merger guidelines describe a “maverick” as “a firm that
plays a disruptive role in the market to the benefit of customers.”80
If T-Mobile chose to discontinue its maverick strategy, there would
be less incentive for its competitors to drop prices to compete.
Further, the plaintiffs argued that DISH would not enter the
market and prevent price increases.81 Entry into the telecommunications market is difficult due to high barriers to entry, including
the massive capital outlay and acquisitions necessary to compete.82
The inability of new competitors to enter the market allows for the
opportunity to raise prices or to coordinate.83 DISH had not previously chosen to enter the market despite extensive spectrum holdings. Therefore, the loss of Sprint could result in disproportionate
adverse effects on the prepaid service market, with fewer low-cost
options for consumers.84 T-Mobile and Sprint were the main competitors for prepaid services.85 The market’s inelastic demand and
high barriers to entry are concerning because any changes to price
will harm consumers, and there is unlikely to be a maverick or new
competitor easily entering. With an almost entirely inelastic demand curve, there is no ready substitute for wireless phone service.86 Consumers will not stop paying for wireless service regardless of price changes. Therefore, the loss of a competitor providing

Telekom AG, 439 F. Supp. 3d 179, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). Notably, the court restated that this
analysis leads only to a presumption and is not definitive. Id.
79. Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 24–25.
80. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, § 2.1.5; see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
& FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 24 (2006),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/commentary-horizontal-merger-guidelines [https://perma.cc/72
D6-ZHTD] (defining maverick firms as those “that have a greater economic incentive to deviate from the terms of coordination than do most of their rivals (e.g., firms that are unusually disruptive and competitive influences in the market.)”).
81. Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 5, 13.
82. Id. at 13 (“There are significant barriers to entering the market and providing mobile wireless telecommunications services. To replace the loss of competition from a nationwide MNO, a new entrant would need to, among other things, acquire spectrum licenses at
a national level, design and construct a nationwide network, and market services nationally.”).
83. Id. at 25.
84. Id. at 5.
85. Id. at 21–22.
86. Id. at 11.
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low-cost services would disproportionately impact the prepaid
wireless service market.87
The plaintiff states argued that the efficiencies, specifically concerning innovation and 5G, were speculative and not merger-specific.88 The plaintiffs based this argument on the untested nature
of the technology the merging firms planned to create, stating
“[t]he claimed efficiencies are based on speculation and assumptions about what the company might achieve years in the future
using new and untested technologies and, thus, cannot be verified.”89 They further argued that the individual efforts to roll out
5G networks by T-Mobile and Sprint showed that a 5G network
could be completed without the merger.90 The plaintiffs believed
the aforementioned effects would result in decreased competition
due to the merger, and should therefore be prevented from moving
forward.
2. Defendants’ Arguments
To rebut the plaintiffs’ suit, the defendants presented procompetitive effects showing that the merger would result in increased
competition, decreased prices, and other benefits to the public.
Competition would arguably increase due to the entry of DISH and
the incentives for T-Mobile to continue its maverick strategy to attract more customers.91 The defendants suggested this increased
competition would result in decreased prices because T-Mobile’s efficiencies would allow it to lower costs and it would need new customers or risk wasting its excess capacity.92 Finally, the public interest was said to be served through the accelerated rollout of a 5G
network and expanded service offerings.93
Contrary to the plaintiffs’ argument, the defendants predicted
that competition would increase with the entry of DISH and T-Mobile’s lower costs. The defendants presented DISH as a viable en-

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 29–30.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
Defendants’ Pretrial Memorandum, supra note 53, at 14.
Id.
Id. at 28–30.
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trant to the telecommunications market due to its substantial spectrum holdings and the forthcoming divestitures of retail locations,
spectrum, and access to T-Mobile’s network.94 The defendants referred to comments from both the DOJ and FCC which confirmed
that DISH would have significant incentives to expand its wireless
services in response to any price increases.95 The divestitures to
DISH would provide it the capability to compete, and any decrease
in competition would provide incentives for DISH to take customers from the other competitors.96
The defendants argued prices would decrease because of lower
costs and greater capacity. The lower costs resulting from the efficiencies and carrier aggregation would allow T-Mobile to increase
quality and decrease prices.97 The increased capacity of the merged
entity would incentivize the new company to continue its maverick
behavior and increase competition, and would not lead to increased
costs.98 The new T-Mobile would need to maximize profits by taking customers from its competitors, not by colluding with them.99
The excess capacity would be a wasted expenditure if T-Mobile did
not continue its maverick strategy to steal customers, expand
sales, and thereby find uses for the capacity.100 Capacity would represent a sunk cost to the new T-Mobile, and a failure to attract new
customers could only result in harming T-Mobile’s profits.101
The defendants argued the public interest would be served by
the expansion of service and the accelerated innovation resulting
from the merger. To support this argument, the defendants highlighted the comments of the FCC on the benefits of the merger on
the innovation of 5G technology, arguing that “the Court should
give substantial weight to the FCC’s determination that the mer-

94. Id. at 3.
95. Id. at 3–4.
96. Id. at 27.
97. Id. at 12.
98. Id. at 14; see HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, § 2.12 (“For example, in a market where capacity constraints are significant for many competitors, a firm is
more likely to be a maverick the greater is its excess or divertible capacity in relation to its
sales or its total capacity, and the lower are its direct and opportunity costs of expanding
sales in the relevant market.”).
99. Defendants’ Pretrial Memorandum, supra note 53, at 25–28.
100. Id. at 25.
101. Id.
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ger ‘will result in significant public interest benefits, including encouraging the rapid deployment of a new 5G mobile wireless network, and improving the quality of [wireless] services for American
consumers.’”102 The defendants argued the FCC must be given deference in determining how the public interest is best served in telecommunications transactions.103 Additionally, they argued that
the increased capacity would allow for expansion of service to underserved rural areas, a benefit that would not exist without the
merger.104
3. The District Court’s Decision
The district court found the defendants’ argument persuasive. It
held that the merger would result in procompetitive effects, including efficiencies, innovation, a new expansion of service, and the
likely entry of a new competitor, which would outweigh the potential for harm to competition.105
Efficiencies are a central concern for telecommunications firms
because of the scarcity of essential inputs. The barriers to entry for
wireless service providers cause (to an extent) a natural oligopoly.106 Spectrum is a finite resource and more firms in the market
would not enhance the consumer product; rather, more firms would
likely degrade it.107 Creating more competitors to compete for 5G
will not necessarily result in a quicker or better product, with the
supply of spectrum being further divided and hurting the competitors’ infrastructure.108 As the district court found in Deutsche Telekom AG, the logistical realities of the allocation and limited supply of spectrum are a necessary consideration to balance

102. Id. at 29.
103. Id. (quoting FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981)).
104. Id. at 30.
105. New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 439 F. Supp. 3d 179, 207–10, 230, 248 (S.D.N.Y.
2020).
106. See Issue Brief: A Communications Oligopoly on Steroids, supra note 1.
107. Division of the limited amount of spectrum among more parties is logically counter
to the efficiencies found in carrier aggregation.
108. Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, Gregory Rosston & Andrzej Skrzypacz, Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services, 54 J.L. & ECON. S167, S169
(2011) (describing “best use” of the assignment of spectrum).
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competition concerns in telecommunications.109 The defense focused on the essential benefits of the merger-specific efficiencies.110
The district court held that “[t]he undisputed evidence at trial reflects that combining Sprint and T-Mobile’s low-band and midband spectrum on one network will not merely result in the sum of
Sprint and T-Mobile’s standalone capacities, but will instead multiply the combined network’s capacity because of . . . ‘carrier aggregation.’”111 This resulting “carrier aggregation” is an efficiency that
would not exist without the merger.112 For purposes of evaluating
competitive effects, efficiencies due to a merger are a valid procompetitive argument under the federal merger guidelines.113
Low- and medium-band spectrum could be combined and deployed more effectively than by either T-Mobile or Sprint individually. The district court found the defendants’ argued efficiencies
to be plausible and that they would include
(1) more than doubling the standalone firms’ network capacity, which
is projected to result in 15 times the speeds now offered by the four
major MNOs to consumers; (2) saving $26 billion in network costs and
another $17 billion in other operating costs; (3) increasing network
coverage to strengthen competition in underserved markets; and (4)
accelerating the provision of 5G service.114

The defendants had argued that these efficiencies would increase
competition.115 The district court agreed and held that the new TMobile efficiencies would result in “low network marginal costs and
more excess capacity to fill than AT&T and Verizon” and that “[TMobile] could rationally lower its prices and advertise the higher
quality of its network to attract customers away from AT&T and
Verizon, thus increasing competition in the RMWTS Markets.”116

109. 439 F. Supp. 3d at 190–92.
110. Defendants’ Pretrial Memorandum, supra note 53, at 21–24.
111. Deutsche Telekom, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 208.
112. Id.
113. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, § 4 (“Efficiencies generated
through merger can enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which may
result in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new products. For example,
merger-generated efficiencies may enhance competition by permitting two ineffective [e.g.,
high-cost] competitors to form a more effective [e.g., lower-cost] competitor. . . .”).
114. Deutsche Telekom, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 208.
115. Defendants’ Pretrial Memorandum, supra note 53, at 21.
116. Deutsche Telekom, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 210.
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Additionally, the district court considered the settlement and
opinions of the federal agencies regarding innovation through the
5G rollout plan.117 The FCC had voiced its agreement with this argument, stating “5G also holds the potential to create three million
new jobs in our country and $500 billion in GDP growth as well as
providing additional competition in the market for in-home connectivity.”118 Both the DOJ and FCC emphasized a focus on facilitating the rollout of this next step in telecommunications.119 The agencies argued the merger would allow the new T-Mobile to use the
gained spectrum for allocation to the 5G network and would result
in a better product.120 Prior to the merger, T-Mobile’s supply of
spectrum consisted primarily of low-band, while Sprint’s spectrum
was mostly medium-band.121 Low-band spectrum is best for
spread-out areas and spreading signal farther, while the mediumband spectrum is useful for denser areas and population centers.122
The district court agreed with the defendants’ and federal agencies’
arguments concerning positive impacts on innovation. It held that
“[a]lthough 5G, the latest technological standard for mobile wireless telecommunications services, is primarily being deployed
across the mid-band spectrum worldwide, this type of deployment
has been relatively difficult in the United States because additional undeployed mid-band spectrum is not readily available.”123
There is limited supply for all mobile carriers to utilize in advancing to 5G, so the district court believed that combining efforts
would make that advancement more readily achievable.124
The argued benefits to innovation from the merger were not limited to the 5G network, with the district court giving weight to
plans of substantially expanding services in rural markets. The

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 224.
T-Mobile U.S., Inc., 34 FCC Rcd. 10,578, 10,580–81 (2019).
See id.; Statement of Interest, supra note 44, at 3, 7–8.
T-Mobile U.S., Inc., 34 FCC Rcd. 10,578, 10,581 (2019).
Defendants’ Pretrial Memorandum, supra note 53, at 12.
NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., IDENTIFYING KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF BANDS
COMMERCIAL DEPLOYMENTS AND
APPLICATIONS: FINAL REPORT AND
FOR
RECOMMENDATIONS 8–9 (2017), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/key_charac
teristics_sub-committee_final_report_nov_17_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8JV-XSW5]; Defendants’ Pretrial Memorandum, supra note 53, at 6.
123. New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 439 F. Supp. 3d 179, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
124. NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., supra note 122.
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creation of a new product may serve as a rebuttal of the anticompetitive effects of a restraint on trade.125 Analysis of efficiencies
may include a new product created by a restraint on trade (here,
the merger) and evaluate whether the product could exist without
the restraint.126 Here, the new product available to customers is
new—or more significant—services in rural markets.127 The service in the rural markets, at least at the anticipated quality, would
not exist without the efficiencies created by the merger. The district court described the improvements as follows:
New T-Mobile’s 5G network will cover 99% of the United States population with speeds faster than 50 Mbps within six years—double the
Commission’s definition of advanced telecommunications capability. . . . Rural communities will see especially large benefits from such
5G connectivity as coverage and throughput in rural areas can often
lag urban deployment . . . high-speed wireless connections are more
valuable for those who lack quality fixed service, telehealth services
are more highly demanded the further one lives from a doctor, and
distance learning is more important for those far from schools. By
bringing new connectivity and competition to underserved rural areas, the transaction will help to ensure that 5G will close the digital
divide.128

Finally, the district court held that DISH was a likely entrant to
the market.129 The entry of a new competitor is a defense to a Clayton Act Section 7 claim.130 An entry defense requires a future entrant to be realistic and imminent.131 The federal merger guidelines provide that the entrant must be “timely, likely, and
sufficient in its magnitude, character, and scope” to address anticompetitive concerns.132 Entry defenses are likely to be uncommon
in telecommunications due to the market’s high barriers to entry.133 Effective entry to the telecommunications market requires
125. Compare Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), with
Deutsche Telekom, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 197 (holding that the service will be developed in rural
regions as a result of the merger).
126. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, § 4.
127. T-Mobile U.S., Inc., 34 FCC Rcd. 10,578, 10,581 (2019).
128. Id.
129. Deutsche Telekom, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 229–32.
130. Recent Proposed Judgment, 133 HARV. L. REV. 739, 741 (2019) (“Entry is a hallmark
defense to section 7 merger challenges that is based on the idea that a merger will not have
anticompetitive effects because a new firm will enter the market and replace the lost competition.” (internal citations omitted)).
131. See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
132. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, § 8.
133. Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 29 (describing the difficulty in entering the
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a certain minimum threshold of spectrum and infrastructure.134
Here, DISH is the salient example: despite significant holdings of
spectrum, it had still refrained from entering the market.135 DISH
may have lacked sufficient access to low-band spectrum because of
the difficulty in procuring it and an inability to purchase specific
bandwidths at auction.136 The district court stated there had not
been an auction for low-band frequency in the last five years, and
that there was no current plan to have one.137 DISH’s extensive
spectrum holdings make it a more realistic new entrant than almost any other firm, which influenced the district court’s decision
to hold it as a “sufficient,” “likely,” and “timely” entrant to the market.138 DISH’s ability to meet the minimum spectrum threshold
would be measurably improved by the settlement granting divestitures of spectrum, prepaid subscribers, retail locations, and access
to the T-Mobile network.
As antitrust enforcers and courts strive to balance the twin goals
of consumer and aggregate welfare, creating or maintaining the
most effective competitors is essential. Here, competition may be
better served by the new competitor than by the current firm being
acquired. The district court compared DISH and Sprint as future
competitors in the market and found DISH would more likely benefit from competition.139 The district court found Sprint unlikely to
be an effective competitor, stating that Sprint did not possess the
“financial and operational means to survive in the near term as a
national wireless carrier.”140 The opinion further provided that
Sprint’s failure was likely due to the vast resources needed to meet
the growing demand for 5G service.141 Not only will DISH have access to its own spectrum reserves, Sprint’s spectrum, and retail locations, it will also be able to piggyback off its competitor’s (new TMobile’s) network to decrease costs.

market due to high barriers to entry).
134. Deutsche Telekom, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 228–30.
135. DISH’s failure to enter the market may be attributable to other business decisions.
136. See Deutsche Telekom, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 190, 211.
137. Id. at 211.
138. Id. at 226–33.
139. Id. at 233, 246.
140. Id. at 246.
141. Id.
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D. Effects of the States’ Litigation
Following the decision in Deutsche Telekom AG, it is no longer
an open question if the T-Mobile-Sprint merger is valid under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.142 The states have declined to appeal, and
the merger has closed, albeit with regulatory pushback from the
CPUC.143 The intervention of the states did not result in a new settlement, new divestitures, or a restructuring of the deal. The negotiated agreement with the DOJ and FCC will serve as the framework of the new T-Mobile moving forward. The question becomes,
what resulted from the collective state action? Simply put, reallocation (waste) of judicial, federal, and state government resources
and the delay of business for the merging parties.
II. PRIOR DIVERGENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
ENFORCERS
Despite the recent significant overlap between state and federal
enforcement actions, the two levels of government generally have
different areas of expertise for antitrust. The current antitrust system is multilayered with different domains, enforcement abilities,
and motives. The degree of federal enforcement has risen and
fallen based upon different executive administrative goals.144 Recent state action reflects the established trend of state involvement
increasing in times of more lax federal enforcement.145
State and federal enforcers vary in organization and purpose.
The primary federal antitrust enforcers, the DOJ and FTC, generally divide sectors of the economy based on their enforcement history. The DOJ is a federal law enforcement agency with a greater
range of remedies than is enjoyed by the FTC, including criminal

142. See id. at 249.
143. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
144. See Juan A. Arteaga, New York State Attorney General Office Fast Becoming Epicenter of Reinvigorated State Antitrust Enforcement, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.
law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/09/20/new-york-state-attorney-general-office-fast-becom
ing-epicenter-of-reinvigorated-state-antitrust-enforcement/
[https://perma.cc/5EK7-RR
NA].
145. See Michael F. Brockmeyer & Jeffrey I. Zuckerman, Should Divestiture Be Limited
to Federal Enforcers—Point/Counterpoint, 4 ANTITRUST L.J. 37, 37–38 (1990).
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prosecution.146 The FTC is a bipartisan group with the dual missions of promoting competition and protecting consumers, and may
target more extensive ranges of behavior by enforcing the Federal
Trade Commission Act against “unfair competition.”147 The states’
domain is consumer protection of their citizens. States are not limited to suing under federal law and may bring actions available to
them under their respective state’s law.148 Even with application
of the same law, there are many different logistical considerations,
such as limited staff and resources devoted to antitrust. These logistical difficulties cause most multistate actions to be led by larger
states, with smaller states only contributing their limited sized antitrust sections as support.149 Another significant difference between the enforcers is that state enforcers are generally elected officials while federal enforcers are appointed officials.150 As elected
officials, States’ Attorneys General are representing their constituents and will enforce antitrust in a manner that best benefits
those constituents.
State action is continuing to rise, with collective action becoming
a cemented enforcement strategy.151 The National Association of
Attorneys General (“NAAG”) serves to help organize disparate
state enforcers and gives them a forum to discuss enforcement policies and cooperation.152 The NAAG emulates a federal agency in
geographic breadth of enforcement but is comprised of individual
states and their elected officials (the States’ Attorneys General).153

146. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIV., AN ANTITRUST PRIMER FOR FEDERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL 1–2, 7 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1091651/dow
nload [https://perma.cc/4AQA-DCG8].
147. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58; see What We Do, FED. TRADE
COMM’N [hereinafter What We Do, FTC], https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do [https://
perma.cc/KP4Q-R7X7].
148. See Koch et al., supra note 51, at 534–35 (discussing state antitrust laws and methods through which states may enforce them).
149. See D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 1055, 1088–89 (2010).
150. See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, Federalism in Antitrust, supra note 15, at 893.
151. See, e.g., Andrew Kragie, Colorado Lets AG Bring State-Law Merger Challenges,
LAW360 (Mar. 24, 2020, 7:28 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1256517/colorado-letsag-bring-state-law-merger-challenges [https://perma.cc/2U5N-S4FK]; cf. id. at 879–81 (describing the role of states in large national transactions and an example of a major case).
152. NAT’L ASS’N ATT’YS GEN., https://www.naag.org/ [https://perma.cc/Z2XZ-YBQK].
153. Id.
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It achieves its influence through standing committees and task
forces, including its Multistate Antitrust Task Force.154
Collective actions by states face several unique issues, including
coordination costs, differences in law, and different enforcement
policies. Differing confidentiality laws may affect investigations
and the scope of information requests.155 Separate standards on
vertical restraints in state and federal law may lead to greater enforcement by States’ Attorneys General.156 Also, each state’s enforcement policy may vary due to economic and political differences.157 The fragmentation of central authority over enforcement
prevents the ability purposefully not to enforce if the behavior at
hand is necessary to achieve a broader policy goal.158
While states may differ with respect to their enforcement policies, previous collective state action has led to several disagreements with federal enforcement decisions. In 1994, the DOJ and
several states filed suit against Microsoft in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.159 In the end, multiple states
disagreed with the settlement forged by the federal enforcement
agency.160 Nine states joined the DOJ settlement, while nine other
states proposed substantially different remedies.161 The dissenting
states demanded concessions beyond the scope of the federal settlement, including forcing Microsoft to license significant intellectual property cheaply and to change the company’s product offerings.162 Here, the states undercut a federally engineered
settlement, resulting in delays to the suit and continued argument
154. Multistate Task Force, NAT’L ASS’N ATT’YS GEN., https://www.naag.org/naag/comm
ittees/naag_standing_committees/antitrust-committee/multistatete_task_force.php [https:
//perma.cc/4EKY-KFYU].
155. See Lande, supra note 15, at 1063 (“The prospect of simultaneous investigations or
suits by both federal and state enforcers gives rise to more than just costs, delays and uncertainty. As the number of parties increase . . . [c]onfidentiality problems also multiply as
the number of investigations rise.”).
156. Margaret Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 739
(2011).
157. Hahn & Layne-Farrar, Federal Preemption in Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 15,
at 79.
158. Waller, supra note 15, at 829.
159. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
160. See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, Federalism in Antitrust, supra note 15, at 896–97.
161. Hahn & Layne-Farrar, Federal Preemption in Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 15,
at 80.
162. Id.

GROSSO 552 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

2/11/2021 10:24 AM

ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS

637

over the appropriate remedy.163 The undercutting of the Microsoft
settlement is comparable to the T-Mobile-Sprint merger, where the
DOJ and FCC negotiated for divestitures to ensure the national
goals of both agencies were satisfied, but still faced pushback from
a group of states. If the states and federal enforcers do not agree
on the terms of a settlement, the states become a complication to
the adjudication process.164 The inability to rely upon a negotiated
settlement agreement also creates uncertainty for merger parties.
In 2015, during the AT&T-Time Warner merger, twenty states
investigated; none joined DOJ’s action.165 The DOJ had filed suit
to block the vertical merger, alleging violations of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act.166 Nine states filed amicus briefs opposing the DOJ’s
suit.167 The DOJ eventually lost the appeal, and the merger proceeded.168 Instead of a national industry facing a unified enforcement front, the enforcement efforts became fragmented and contradictory. The divergence in enforcement policies showed the
competing interests at issue for each enforcer. This split is also apparent in the divergence between the states opposing the T-MobileSprint merger and the DOJ, FCC, and states supporting it.
In an action against American Express in the Second Circuit,
the DOJ—the original lead plaintiff—resorted to opposing an appeal by its co-plaintiff states.169 The DOJ and a group of states had
filed suit in 2010 in the Eastern District of New York alleging violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.170 Following a Second Circuit decision against the DOJ and plaintiff states, the DOJ maintained the Second Circuit opinion was incorrect but filed a brief in
opposition to the states’ petition for a writ of certiorari.171 The DOJ
163. Hahn & Layne-Farrar, Federalism in Antitrust, supra note 15, at 892.
164. See Lande, supra note 15, at 1063. (“The prospect of simultaneous investigations or
suits by both federal and state enforcers gives rise to more than just costs, delays and uncertainty. As the number of parties increase, settlements may become exponentially more
difficult to reach.”).
165. Arteaga, supra note 144, at 2.
166. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 164 (D.D.C. 2018).
167. Id.
168. Edmund Lee & Cecilia Kang, U.S. Loses Appeal Seeking to Block AT&T-Time
Warner Merger, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/26/business
/media/att-time-warner-appeal.html [https://perma.cc/L9VF-85Y2].
169. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2283 (2018); Arteaga, supra note 144, at 2.
170. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2283.
171. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 16–17, Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274
(No. 16-1454).
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advocated for further “percolation in the lower courts,” arguing
that conflict between the lower courts on the issue was necessary
before the Supreme Court should resolve the issue.172 The plaintiff
states maintained their writ for certiorari, and eventually lost in
the Supreme Court.173 The three aforementioned splits in enforcement choices show that the divergence between state and federal
enforcement leads to uncertain outcomes, decreases the effectiveness of settlements, and prevents nonenforcement policies that
may serve a broader goal.
III. EVOLVING REGULATION IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRY
To review the anticompetitive effects of a merger, courts and
agencies use a “totality-of-the-circumstances” approach.174 The
analysis of a market “must always be attuned to the particular
structure and circumstances of the industry at issue.”175 Therefore,
a totality of the circumstances analysis requires due consideration
of the effects of regulation on this market. The telecommunications
market faces a substantial degree of scrutiny and federal regulation because of the multitude of enforcement agencies. Market-specific circumstances in telecommunications include the effects of
regulation, the barriers to entry, and the scarcity of essential inputs. Here, regulators substantially influence competition by controlling entry and inputs, which makes the effects of heavy regulation crucial to evaluating the market. Overregulation can lead to
decreases in the aggregate social welfare. Deadweight loss, an economic concept representing the cost of market inefficiency, can be
caused by government interference in the market.176
In Deutsche Telekom AG, the court recognized the exceptional
nature of the telecommunications market as a factor for antitrust
analysis due to the heightened regulatory scrutiny, stating that
172. Id. at 17.
173. Arteaga, supra note 144, at 2.
174. United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
175. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411
(2004).
176. See Fisher et al., supra note 31, at 779 n.4 (describing deadweight loss as “pure
social loss”); see also Taylor LaJoie, Reviewing the Deadweight Loss Effects of High Tax
Rates, TAX FOUND. (Nov. 8, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/deadweight-loss-effects-hightax-rates/ [https://perma.cc/7ARM-4JB7] (discussing deadweight loss in the context of tax).
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[t]he industry’s profound impact and importance also serve as a big
spotlight to focus more intense attention of public regulators and other
law enforcement officials to be more vigilant and aggressive in promoting the public interest and protecting consumers and the national
economy from harm. That oversight helps ensure lawful business conduct and enforcement of compliance with remedial commitments the
government imposes to enhance competition, as witnessed in this case
by the intervention of both federal and various state agencies.177

Telecommunications competitors are faced with a deep stable of
regulators, massive compliance costs, and limited behavioral
choices. The telecommunications market is regulated not just by
the DOJ178 and FTC,179 but also by the FCC,180 the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (“NTIA”),181 the
Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”),182 and increasingly by
CFIUS.183 The variety of governmental controls over firm behavior
indicates how structured the market has become. The firms must
comply with numerous priorities, including antitrust, consumer
protection, and national security. The result is less freedom to compete and innovate. The addition of further regulations or enforcement actions will serve to compound the restrictions and result in
costs to the firms and lessened competition.
A. Telecommunications Agencies
Beyond the standard federal antitrust enforcers, the FCC and
NTIA are telecommunications-specific agencies that regulate the
behavior of competitors in the market.184 These two agencies regulate spectrum, an essential input for wireless communication.185
Spectrum is purchased through government-controlled auctions.186
177. New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 439 F. Supp. 3d 179, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
178. See supra Part I.
179. What We Do, FTC, supra note 147.
180. What We Do, FED. COMM. COMM’N [hereinafter What We Do, FCC], https://www.
fcc.gov/about-fcc/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/VQK6-U8W7].
181. About NTIA, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., https://www.ntia.doc.gov/about
[https://perma.cc/R4BX-3A7B].
182. What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N [hereinafter What We Do, SEC], https://
www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html [https://perma.cc/89B9-U2T3].
183. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment
-in-the-united-states-cfius [https://perma.cc/GK5E-PVVC].
184. See supra notes 180–81.
185. See supra notes 180–81.
186. Broadcast Incentive Auction Scheduled to Begin on March 29, 2016; Procedures for
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The FCC holds auctions for spectrum after deciding the type and
amount of spectrum it will sell to businesses.187 The NTIA serves
as a second regulator on spectrum allocation by recommending policy goals and aiding the FCC in determining the allocation of spectrum.188
The FCC is responsible for the licensing, allocation, and distribution of spectrum to providers.189 Spectrum is a central concern
for competition in the market, serving as the most significant barrier to entry due to its scarcity.190 A crucial consideration is the
differences between each type of bandwidth and the need to allocate it carefully to create an effective telecommunications network.
Spectrum is comprised of multiple bandwidths: low, medium, and
high, each with unique strengths and weaknesses.191 Similar to the
DOJ and FTC,192 the FCC may evaluate a merger of firms within
its purview for the merger’s effects on competition.193 As a specificsector regulator, the FCC is in a unique position to balance the issue of spectrum scarcity with the competitive effects of a merger.194
One of the most substantial barriers to entry is the difficulty in
acquiring a necessary spectrum threshold to conduct business; the
sale of spectrum is regulated by the FCC through auctions.195
Competitive Bidding in Auction 1000, 80 Fed. Reg. 61,918, 61,918, 61,920 (Oct. 14, 2015) (to
be codified 47 C.F.R. pt. 20); JAMES A. LEWIS, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES,
SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND NATIONAL SECURITY 2 (2017), https:
//www.csis.org/analysis/spectrum-management-economic-growth-and-national-security
[https://perma.cc/J52G-YKUJ].
187. About Auctions, FED. COMM. COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/auctions/about-auctions
[https://perma.cc/5LDF-FTT6].
188. About NTIA, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., https://www.ntia.doc.gov/about
[https://perma.cc/R4BX-3A7B].
189. What We Do, FCC, supra note 180.
190. New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 439 F. Supp. 3d 179, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (describing how DISH’s spectrum holdings will allow it to bypass the high barriers to entry).
191. NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., supra note 122.
192. See supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text.
193. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 401, 132 Stat. 348,
1087–88 (2018) (requiring that the FCC publish and submit to Congress every two years a
report on its actions in the marketplace and its agenda for the next two years); Mergers and
Acquisitions, FED. COMM. COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/proceedings-actions/mergers-andacquisitions [https://perma.cc/J36L-WP4E].
194. See D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting Anticompetitive Government Interventions That Benefit Special Interests, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 119, 142 (2009) (“Sector regulation may also
include requirements for the supply and/or quality of service, depending on the sector. Strategic factors may play a role in how sector regulators choose to regulate, given overall political economy concerns.”).
195. Deutsche Telekom, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 211 (describing the difficulties in acquiring
spectrum and the auctions facilitated by the FCC).
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These auctions occur with the FCC’s determination of the type of
bandwidth available to competitors and after the reservation of
segments of bandwidth for government use.196 The FCC is required
to consider all forms of competition, report on service by geographic
area, and consider the market-entry barriers under the national
policy to promote competition, technological advancement, “public
interest, convenience, and necessity.”197 As discussed in Part I, the
FCC’s actions in the T-Mobile-Sprint merger track its congressionally designated goals. The advancement of 5G technology, expansion to rural markets, and economic efficiencies fit the regulatory
aims of the agency.
The NTIA, through its Office of Spectrum Management, further
regulates spectrum.198 Under the directive of the Spectrum Pipeline Act of 2015,199 the NTIA allocates frequencies with assistance
from the Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee, the Policy
and Plans Steering Group, and the Commerce Spectrum Management Advisory Committee.200 The goal of the NTIA is to administer
spectrum and propose policies to the executive branch.201 Spectrum
is a finite resource, and wireless carriers do not comprise the only
industry that needs and uses spectrum, with large portions retained by the government.202 The NTIA and FCC can shift the market by reallocating spectrum supply and reducing or increasing the
amount available at auction.203

196. About Auctions, supra note 187; United States Frequency Allocations, FED. COMM.
COMM’N, https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/january_2016_spectrum_wall_cha
rt.pdf [https://perma.cc/EZD5-CAMS].
197. Consolidated Appropriations Act §§ 401, 607(a)(3).
198. Office of Spectrum Management, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., https://www.
ntia.doc.gov/office/OSM [https://perma.cc/A8TE-Y2ZF]; National Spectrum Goals, NAT’L
TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., https://www.ntia.doc.gov/book-page/national-spectrum-goals
[https://perma.cc/C8V6-S83R]; United States Frequency Allocations, FED. COMM. COMM’N,
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/january_2016_spectrum_wall_chart.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EZD5-CAMS].
199. Implementing Certain Provisions of the Spectrum Pipeline Act with Respect to the
Duties of the Technical Panel, 81 Fed. Reg. 3337 (Jan. 21, 2016) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt.
301).
200. Office of Spectrum Management, supra note 198.
201. National Spectrum Goals, supra note 198; Internet Policy, NAT’L TELECOMM. &
INFO. ADMIN., https://www.ntia.doc.gov/category/internet-policy [https://perma.cc/CP72-YX
G4].
202. See generally FCC Online Table of Frequency Allocations, 47 C.F.R. § 2.106 (2020);
FCC Allocation History File, FED. COMM. COMM’N, https://transition.fcc.gov/oet/spectrum/ta
ble/FAHF.pdf [https://perma.cc/RUM3-NR6P].
203. LEWIS, supra note 186, at 1, 3–4 (demonstrating an example of the FCC and NTIA
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The FCC and NTIA decisions regarding spectrum weigh impacts
broader than competition alone. In designating spectrum for use,
the NTIA and FCC must consider: “(A) the need to preserve critical
existing and planned Federal Government capabilities; (B) the impact on existing State, local, and tribal government capabilities;
(C) the international implications; (D) the need for appropriate enforcement mechanisms and authorities; and (E) the importance of
the deployment of wireless broadband services in rural areas.”204
Regulatory control of behavior is not limited to standard antitrust
enforcement. Additional remedies, such as fines, are available under consumer-protection laws.205 The agencies may use allocation
to shape the behaviors available to competitors.206 If the agencies
shift more spectrum to exclusive government use, the scarcity of
this input will change competitor behavior.207 Any given competitor may only acquire greater supply with the consent of these two
agencies.208 The agencies’ allocation of available spectrum serves
as another check on impermissible consolidation of the market.
B. Other Agencies
Further regulation in the telecommunications industry comes
from transparency and national security concerns. Beyond the telecommunications- and antitrust-specific agencies, competitors face
regulatory restrictions from the SEC and CFIUS. The SEC works
to provide transparency for public companies and to prevent abuse

reallocating certain parts of spectrum to the Department of Defense).
204. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 603(a)(7), 132 Stat.
348, 1098–99 (2018) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 1502(a)(7)).
205. Klint Finley, The FCC Fines Wireless Companies for Selling Users’ Location Data,
WIRED (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/fcc-fines-wireless-companies-selling-us
ers-location-data/ [https://perma.cc/GT5W-2DAE].
206. See New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 439 F. Supp. 3d 179, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)
(describing how the spectrum the FCC choses to auction may not meet the needs of competitors).
207. How the Spectrum Is Used, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., https://www.
ntia.doc.gov/bookpage/how-spectrum-used [https://perma.cc/QQZ6-UW73] (showing the variety of government needs for spectrum); How the Spectrum Is Shared, NAT’L TELECOMM. &
INFO. ADMIN., https://www.ntia.doc.gov/book-page/how-spectrum-shared [https://perma.cc/
7RCL-VWK5] (showing the allocation of government-exclusive and private/governmentshared spectrum).
208. See Deutsche Telekom, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 211.
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of the securities market.209 CFIUS focuses on protecting national
security and interference from foreign entities.210
The SEC works to ensure transparency in the dealings of publicly traded companies.211 While not playing a direct role in telecommunications, the SEC’s involvement arises from the publicly
traded nature of the competitors.212 The SEC regulates markets,
aiming to promote fairness and efficiencies, facilitate capital formation, and protect investors.213 The effects of the SEC’s oversight
and involvement create greater transparency and increased compliance costs.214 Compliance with the SEC represents a high cost
and limits behavior options concerning corporate governance.215
The SEC’s involvement is not unique to telecommunications, but
exemplifies another source of regulation competitors face. The
SEC’s effects on competition result from its civil enforcement actions and from promoting the exchange of information in a marketplace.216
Today, telecommunications competitors are facing a new and
rapidly expanding source of regulation: the CFIUS. CFIUS’s evolution into a mainstay regulator of telecommunications is demonstrated by its recent interventions and its changing structure.
CFIUS’s growing authority springs from the Foreign Investment
Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018.217 CFIUS focuses on “critical technologies,” sensitive personal data, and “critical infrastructure,” which includes telecommunications.218 The FCC’s memorandum ruling on the T-Mobile-Sprint merger demonstrated these
209. What We Do, SEC, supra note 182.
210. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, supra note 183.
211. See What We Do, SEC, supra note 182.
212. See T-Mobile Annual Report, supra note 5 (demonstrating that T-Mobile is a publicly traded company that files corporate governance reports with the SEC); Sprint Quarterly Report, supra note 5 (demonstrating that Sprint is likewise a publicly traded company
that files corporate governance reports with the SEC).
213. See What We Do, SEC, supra note 182.
214. See Thomas A. Sporkin & Meredith Leeson, SEC Risk Factors: A Single Wrong Word
Could Cost Millions, A.B.A. BUS. L. SEC. (Jan. 17, 2020), https://businesslawtoday.org/2020
/01/sec-risk-factors-single-wrong-word-cost-millions/ [https://perma.cc/AY2X-L683].
215. See, e.g., Cydney Posener, SEC Proposes Amendments to Financial Disclosures in
M&A, A.B.A. BUS. L. SEC. (May 10, 2019), https://businesslawtoday.org/2019/05/secprop
oses-amendments-financial-disclosures-ma/ [https://perma.cc/5VRR-KHTB].
216. What We Do, SEC, supra note 182.
217. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L.
No. 115-232, § 1702, 132 Stat. 1636, 2174–77 (2018).
218. Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by CFIUS, 73 Fed.
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focuses by explicitly addressing the national security concerns and
CFIUS’s involvement.219
CFIUS’s role has shifted from serving as a backstop to prevent
foreign control of critical technologies to reviewing foreign purchases of noncontrolling interests.220 In the recent QualcommBroadcom merger, CFIUS intervened and recommended blocking
the transaction.221 When Grindr became a target for Chinese investment, CFIUS forced the divesture of the company to protect
sensitive information of United States citizens.222 CFIUS raised
concerns about the collection of intelligence on U.S. citizens, a concern widely applicable to telecommunications.223 In Huawei’s attempt to expand through the purchase of 3Leaf, CFIUS intervened
and launched a full-scale investigation into Huawei’s governance
practices.224 CFIUS concluded the investigation by stating that any
acquisitions of U.S. assets by Huawei posed a threat to national
security.225 CFIUS’s recent involvement in mergers and acquisitions demonstrates a shift from blocking foreign entities from gaining controlling interests in specific U.S. companies to preventing
foreign investment at lower levels. As such, national security concerns may prevent foreign firms with the capital to purchase the
requisite levels of spectrum from entering the market.226 Blocking
foreign investment further limits the ability of the telecommunications market to operate freely and creates a high barrier to entry.
In addition to the growing frequency of CFIUS interventions,
structural changes to the committee suggest it may take an even
more significant role in the future.227 CFIUS has announced it will
Reg. 74,567 (Dec. 8, 2008).
219. T-Mobile U.S., Inc., 34 FCC Rcd. 10,578, 10,732–33 (2019).
220. See 31 C.F.R. § 800.101 (2020).
221. Exec. Order No. 2018-05479, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,631 (Mar. 12, 2018).
222. Sarah Bauerle Danzman & Geoffrey Gertz, Why is the U.S. Forcing a Chinese Company to Sell the Gay Dating App Grindr?, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/politics/2019/04/03/why-is-us-is-forcing-chinese-company-sell-gay-dating-appgrindr/ [https://perma.cc/SC4U-GQYM].
223. Id.
224. Patrick Griffin, Note, CFIUS in the Age of Chinese Investment, 85 FORDHAM L. REV.
1757, 1778–79 (2017).
225. Id. at 1779.
226. Alan Rappeport, U.S. Outlines Plans to Scrutinize Chinese and Other Foreign Investment, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/17/us/politics/chi
na-foreign-investment-cfius.html [https://perma.cc/PUC4-GGPB].
227. Here, there is an assumption that collecting fees will increase the budget, allowing
CFIUS to review more transactions, hire more staff, and generally conduct business on a
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begin collecting merger filing fees, similar to those imposed on companies by the HSR Act.228 This restructuring reflects CFIUS’s
growing involvement in mergers and provides the funding to continue in a more active role. Another recent development in telecommunications oversight includes “Team Telecom,” a collection of executive-branch leaders who recently recommended the FCC
“terminate China Telecom (Americas) Corp.’s authorizations to
provide international telecommunications services to and from the
United States.”229 Team Telecom’s posture towards foreign activity
in telecommunications is another example of the rising policies
seen in CFIUS’s interventions. As regulatory authorities grow in
scope and number, compliance in telecommunications becomes an
increasingly difficult prospect.
IV. EFFECTS OF PREEMPTING COLLECTIVE STATE ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
State and federal antitrust enforcement disagreements in telecommunications cause conflicting enforcement objectives, false
positives, and reduced efficiencies, and further prevent nonenforcement policies. One option to mitigate the interference of state enforcers is the preemption of collective state antitrust enforcement
in this market. A field preemption of state law occurs when the
“Federal Government has occupied the entire field . . . .”230 The Supreme Court of the United States held that
[a]bsent explicit pre-emptive language, Congress’ intent to supersede
state law altogether may be found from a “scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,” because “the Act of
Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement
of state laws on the same subject,” or because “the object sought to be

larger scale.
228. Filing Fees for Notices of Certain Investments in the United States by Foreign Persons and Certain Transactions by Foreign Persons Involving Real Estate in the United
States, 85 Fed. Reg. 13,586 (Mar. 9, 2020).
229. Executive Branch Agencies Recommend the FCC Revoke and Terminate China Telecom’s Authorizations to Provide International Telecommunications Services in the United
States, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/executive-branchagencies-recommend-fcc-revoke-and-terminate-china-telecom-s-authorizations [https://per
ma.cc/7UHB-E9XM].
230. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S.
190, 212–13 (1983) (internal citations omitted).
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obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed
by it may reveal the same purpose.”231

This contemplated preemption should not be read as applying to
antitrust law generally, where the states have apparent authority
to act;232 instead, it should be viewed more narrowly in the context
of the regulatory scheme in telecommunications.
Conflict arises where state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.”233 The federal regulatory scheme in telecommunications has become so pervasive that any conflict with state law
should be preempted.234 State enforcers work to protect the consumers of their respective states and should continue to do so. But
the immense federal regulatory scheme in telecommunications
makes the market a unique one, not well suited to state actions
and better handled by specialized federal agencies.235 While Congress intended to give states the power to enforce antitrust law,
state antitrust enforcers may be exceeding this authority in a market that has become thoroughly occupied by the federal government.
The regulatory landscape of telecommunications stands apart.
The large number of regulatory bodies, rules, and statutes governing conduct in telecommunications leads to the conclusion that the
federal government has filled the field in telecommunications. The
federal regulators have continued to expand antitrust enforcement
in the telecommunications market, moving from preventing foreign control of sensitive companies to greater oversight of all foreign investment as well as actively facilitating the innovation of
5G technology in the field. The recent changes demonstrate the enhanced federal interest in the competition of this market and the

231. Id. at 203–04 (quoting Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,
153 (1982)).
232. See Stanley Mosk, State Antitrust Enforcement and Coordination with Federal Enforcement, 21 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. 358, 363 (1962).
233. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297, 303 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Arizona v.
United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012)).
234. See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399 (“The intent to displace state law altogether can be
inferred from a framework of regulation ‘so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it’ or where there is a ‘federal interest . . . so dominant that the federal
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.’” (citations omitted)).
235. See supra Part III.
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national security concerns that remain a backdrop to telecommunications transactions.
A. Benefits of Preempting Collective State Action
Preemption would result in cognizable benefits to the regulatory
and business spheres. These benefits would include clear guidance,
increased enforcement efficiencies, and the ability to pursue nonenforcement agendas and broader policy goals.236 Businesses
would receive clear guidance on the legality of their business
choices. State antitrust enforcers would redeploy costs to state-specific issues. Federal enforcers would be able to effectively pursue
broader policy goals.
Consolidated enforcement and regulatory schemes would provide clarity to businesses through more uniform regulations and
decreased litigation concerns. This consolidation, in turn, would reduce costs for the government and the competitors while encouraging competition and unnecessary compliance costs.237 Clear regulations serving a common goal, without the inherent biases of
individual state interests, can provide clarity to businesses and
preserve the balancing of consumer welfare with the aggregate social welfare. Individual states make decisions based on their individual needs, as seen in the T-Mobile-Sprint merger.238 When federal law conflicts with state law, federal law controls.239 Despite
this standard, multistate task forces continue to come forward as
the interpreters of federal law.240 This approach poses problems
because of the inherent state biases that underlie the enforcement

236. See Landes & Posner, supra note 15, at 39 (“The existence of a public monopoly of
enforcement in a particular area of the law is a necessary . . . condition of discretionary nonenforcement.”).
237. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 16 (2008) [hereinafter COMPETITION AND
MONOPOLY] (describing decision theory’s role in antitrust and the effects of false positives).
238. Tali Arbel, supra note 11 (“Texas, Nevada, Colorado and Mississippi have dropped
out over the past two months after reaching separate settlements in which T-Mobile typically promised 5G service in the states and steady prices or low-price options.”).
239. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
240. See, e.g., supra Part II.

GROSSO 552 (DO NOT DELETE)

648

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

2/11/2021 10:24 AM

[Vol. 55:615

actions. Preemption could decrease the effects of individual state
biases on the guidance given to competitors.
Antitrust analysis considers geographic differences in determining the concentration of a market, meaning a one-size-fits-all approach does not work for aggregating individual state markets.241
This restructuring would reduce the effects of an individual state’s
interests on collective action.242 While any individual state may be
best served by one plan, the economy as a whole might suffer for
that decision.243 “Divergent approaches to the exercise of enforcement discretion are not just possible, they are likely.”244 States
likely face pressure from several groups that can influence their
enforcement decisions, as well as the selfish motivation to protect
their consumers regardless of the cost to national welfare.245 Uniform, clear guidance at the federal level, without state interference, will reduce opportunities for the individual motivations of
states to negatively impact a clear enforcement scheme. Adding
states as parties to a telecommunications antitrust lawsuit complicates the suit by increasing the number of parties that must agree
to a settlement.246 The effects of the preemption and resulting enforcement system will create efficiencies for federal and state enforcers, as well as for businesses. For telecommunications antitrust
enforcement actions, this will limit costs to the federal agencies,
prevent the duplication of effort (in reviewing transactions), and
eliminate the costs of coordination that NAAG multistate enforcement teams face.247 Extending even beyond telecommunications,
this results in a net positive for the antitrust sections of state attorneys general offices to redeploy resources to monitor and combat

241. See KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 62, § 24.03; 2 BYRON E. FOX & ELEANOR M. FOX,
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS § 16.06 (2020).
242. Sokol, supra note 149, at 1089.
243. Posner, supra note 15, at 940 (asserting the effect of state involvement is to
“lengthen the original lawsuit, complicate settlement, magnify and protract the uncertainty
engendered by the litigation, and increase litigation costs.”).
244. Lemos, supra note 156, at 720.
245. See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, Federalism in Antitrust, supra note 15, at 897.
246. Lande, supra note 15, at 1063 (“The prospect of simultaneous investigations or suits
by both federal and state enforcers gives rise to more than just costs, delays and uncertainty.
As the number of parties increase, settlements may become exponentially more difficult to
reach. Confidentiality problems also multiply as the number of investigations rise.”).
247. Hahn & Layne-Farrar, Federal Preemption in Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 15,
at 80.
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anticompetitive behavior in the state-specific areas that these sections were designed to handle.248
The reduced litigation could represent a net positive for both
state governments and competitors. Even responding to discovery
requests from one state can cost two to nine million dollars.249 Dealing with multiple suits, as in the T-Mobile-Sprint merger, causes a
compounding of these costs resulting from duplication of effort. For
T-Mobile, the firm has now faced multiple reviews concerning the
same issues that it believed it had resolved. The FCC review alone
took 317 days.250 In total, from the initial merger review submission on April 28, 2018, until April 1, 2020, it took two years to close
the transaction.251 The T-Mobile-Sprint merger exemplifies how
further delays can slow the competitor’s ability to continue with
business, as it must divert attention to compliance and litigation
efforts. 252
Preemption would address the effects of the growth of federal
regulators in the telecommunications market, particularly CFIUS,
as well as the resulting changes to the regulatory landscape. If the
states act as another national regulator in telecommunications,
then innovation, competition, and the ability of federal enforcers to
pursue policy goals will be stifled. To solve this problem, collective
state antitrust action should be preempted by federal law in the
telecommunications market. States likely remain better plaintiffs
than consumers in many situations and therefore should litigate
on behalf of their citizens. This litigation should be conducted individually, with federal regulatory enforcement generally left to
federal regulators.
States should not be prevented from enforcing antitrust law; instead, states should focus exclusively on violations of their own
248. See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, Federalism in Antitrust, supra note 15, at 889 (describing the resources available to the antitrust sections of state attorneys general offices).
249. Jonathan Jacobson, Tackling the Time and Cost of Antitrust Litigation, 32
ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 4 (2017).
250. T-Mobile and Sprint, WT Docket-18-197, FED. COMM. COMM’N (Apr. 1, 2020), https://
www.fcc.gov/transaction/t-mobile-sprint [https://perma.cc/TCA6-QZVC].
251. See supra Part I.
252. Following the district court’s decision, the DOJ remarked on the need for finality in
decisions by the federal government. See Justice Department Welcomes Decision in New
York v. Deutsche Telecom, the T-Mobile/Sprint Merger, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 11, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-welcomes-decision-new-york-v-deutsche
-telecom-t-mobilesprint-merger [https://perma.cc/9986-3Z4D].
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state laws and on protecting their citizens as individual enforcers,
not as a collective body. Federal agencies are the proper regulators
of national industries such as telecommunications, while state enforcement prevents federal nonenforcement policies which may
benefit social welfare overall.253 With respect to policy goals,
CFIUS’s interventions in recent years showcase the federal government’s focus on national security concerns in the telecommunications market. Agendas balancing broader policy goals—such as
national security—with competition are only possible under a more
centralized enforcement system and by specialized agencies.254
Specialized agencies are therefore the best regulators of the telecommunications market.255 The requirement that “[a]ntitrust
analysis must always be attuned to the particular structure and
circumstances of the industry at issue” leads to efficiencies from
the use of specialized enforcers.256 The inelasticity of the market
and the significant barriers to entry require oversight by specialized expert regulators to maintain a competitive environment, and
interference from other government regulators will only impede
the ability of the federal regulators to direct this market. Nonenforcement policies, used when the agencies determine doing so is
in the best interests of competition, cannot be enforced without a
monopoly on enforcement.257
Placing control in the hands of more centralized regulators reduces uncertainty for competitors due to the inherent inconsistencies in court proceedings and allows for better market functioning.258 The inability to pursue nonenforcement agendas and reduce
litigation will cause unnecessary false positives. False positives
can discourage competition and innovation.259 Too many false positives will cause competitors to restrict their behavior drastically

253. See Landes & Posner, supra note 15, at 39; Waller, supra note 15, at 829.
254. See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, Federal Preemption in Antitrust Enforcement, supra
note 15, at 79–81; Waller, supra note 15, at 829.
255. See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, Federalism in Antitrust, supra note 15, at 888–90.
256. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411
(2004).
257. See Landes & Posner, supra note 15, at 39.
258. See Sokol, supra note 194, at 147 (“Antitrust litigation produces regulatory uncertainty because different courts may rule inconsistently with the same set of facts.”).
259. See Lande, supra note 15, at 1063.
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to comply with enforcers at the cost of innovative business practices.260 Overenforcement and the resulting false positives reduce
competition, inviting harm to both the consumer and the aggregate
social welfare.261 Reduction in states’ ability to conduct collective
antitrust litigation will naturally decrease the overall amount of
litigation, which provides several benefits to competition and to
regulators. These benefits include reduced compliance costs, legal
fees, and the redistribution of resources.262 Reduced costs will benefit administrative costs, particularly those resulting from the coordination of state agencies. The result is a leaner, specialized enforcement system; increased market freedom due to clear
regulations; and the opportunity for regulators to balance broader
policy goals with antitrust.
B. Dangers of Preempting Collective State Action
It is essential, however, to address the dangers of preempting
collective state antitrust enforcement in telecommunications. The
three main dangers of preemption lie in the under-enforcement of
antitrust, in state-specific issues, and in the balance of power between federal and state governments.
Perhaps the greatest argument for maintaining states’ ability to
litigate collectively is a fear of the federal government under-enforcing antitrust law. If the federal government fails to act or does
so ineffectively, the result could be extensive anticompetitive behavior, including the abuse of consumers, restraints on trade, and
monopolization. Generally, state antitrust enforcers serve as a
check on federal enforcement policies.263 If collective action is
preempted, states will face major logistical hurdles to individually
bring suits against national telecommunications firms. Except for
those in larger states such as New York and California, state-level

260. See id. (“The additional uncertainty from fifty potential state reviews, along with
the inevitable accompanying delays and costs, could cause many beneficial transactions
never to be attempted.”).
261. COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY, supra note 237, at 16 (“The cost of false positives
includes not just the costs associated with the parties before the court (or agency), but also
the loss of procompetitive conduct by other actors that, due to an overly inclusive or vague
decision, are deterred from undertaking such conduct by a fear of litigation.”).
262. See id. (describing enforcement costs and the importance of enforcement discretion).
263. Hahn & Layne-Farrar, Federal Preemption in Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 15,
at 80–81.
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antitrust sections may not be well-funded enough to protect their
constituents’ interests against national firms.264
Further, federal enforcement does not protect individual states
or their distinct issues. The federal enforcement system is just
that: a federal system. Complete preemption of state antitrust action would open the door to discrimination against individual
states and their consumers. Absent federal enforcement and without preserving the rights of states to act in the best interests of
their citizens, the burden would fall solely on private parties. This
could be mitigated by allowing states to litigate on their individual
issues, just not as a class. The antitrust sections in state attorneys
general offices were not designed for enforcement in national markets; they are best suited to deal with state and local violations of
antitrust law.265
Additionally, preempting collective state antitrust enforcement
in telecommunications may be an untenable expansion of federal
power. This is a concern if applied across several markets, but limiting the preemption suggestion to the markets heavily regulated
by the federal government does not produce significant change
from the status quo. States are already limited in what actions
they take in the telecommunications market.266 Current arguments against preemption may fail to realize how far the balance
of power has shifted over the past decade. In particular, CFIUS’s
enhanced involvement has eliminated many nonenforcement
choices for procompetitive deals that do not align with national security concerns, significantly limiting foreign entrants in a wide
variety of markets.267 CFIUS’s interventions often target telecommunications because of its designation as “critical infrastructure.”268 CFIUS’s involvement limits the ability of the DOJ and
264. Id.
265. Stephen Calkins, Perspectives on State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 53 DUKE
L.J. 673, 679–82 (2003) (discussing the advantages of state enforcement in dealing with
local markets and companies).
266. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (“No State or local government shall have any authority to
regulate the entry of or the rates charged by any commercial mobile service or any private
mobile service, except that this paragraph shall not prohibit a State from regulating the
other terms and conditions of commercial mobile services.”); see also AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (holding federal law preempted state law disallowing class
arbitrations).
267. See supra section III.B.
268. See Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by CFIUS, 73
Fed. Reg. 74,567 (Dec. 8, 2008).
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FTC to pursue competition-focused policy goals, which is further
hampered by state involvement.
C. The Path Forward in the Context of the T-Mobile-Sprint
Merger
The preemption of collective state antitrust action in the telecommunications market will benefit competition and serve the antitrust goal of promoting the aggregate social welfare. This
preemption would have created cognizable benefits in the T-Mobile-Sprint merger. Antitrust law cannot serve consumers to the
exclusion of business interests; as the sliding scale moves farther
to consumers’ interests, competition will suffer.269 Preventing state
interference in telecommunications allows federal regulators to
shift their focus from purely consumer welfare to a broader concern
for the aggregate social welfare. In line with this reasoning, the
district court and the federal agencies identified aggregate social
welfare concerns as their primary reason for their consent to the
T-Mobile-Sprint merger.270
In that merger, the effects on the aggregate social welfare included new efficiencies, potentially a stronger competitor, and innovation.271 Oversight by federal regulators in telecommunications
is continuing to rise in scope and type, creating less of a need for
litigation by other parties. Richard Posner described state involvement in federal antitrust as serving to “lengthen the original lawsuit, complicate settlement, magnify and protract the uncertainty
engendered by the litigation, and increase litigation costs.”272 The
plaintiff states’ suit served to delay the competitors’ ability to move
forward with business and further created unnecessary costs and
burdens on the competitors and courts. Nothing in the events surrounding the T-Mobile-Sprint merger suggests that Posner was
wrong. DISH’s ability to begin deploying spectrum and reimplementing Boost Mobile has been delayed because the merger was
delayed. The 5G innovation, a large focus of the federal agencies,
was similarly delayed. The plaintiff states raised legitimate antitrust concerns, but the DOJ and FCC had addressed those issues
269. Blair & Sokol, supra note 27, at 2509.
270. Statement of Interest, supra note 44, at 10.
271. See supra section I.C.3.
272. See Posner, supra note 15, at 940.
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and regulated a path forward while balancing consumer and social
welfare. Consent decrees and settlements will not work if they face
regular challenges by other government actors.
Given the competition analysis the FCC undertakes and reports
to Congress, it must consider the long-term viability of competitors.273 Here, DISH is presented as a potential entrant, while there
are concerns Sprint is no longer a viable firm.274 As the district
court held, “[o]ver the past eight years, DISH has amassed a large
portfolio of spectrum, roughly equivalent in size to that of Verizon,
through a series of private transactions and purchases at FCC auctions. DISH is also financially stable, being a successful provider
of consumer services in the satellite TV industry”275 DISH’s abundant supply of spectrum and financial security make it a realistic
competitor, and potentially a better firm than Sprint to ensure
competition in the market.276
Conversely, Sprint was an ineffective company headed in the
wrong direction.277 Sprint’s subsidiary Boost Mobile was the main
positive for the company, and it is being divested to DISH.278 Financial struggles and bad brand image signal an inability to compete. An ineffective competitor cannot adequately serve as a check
on anticompetitive behavior.279 In telecommunications, ineffective
competition from one competitor can harm the market because of
the allocation of finite spectrum to that competitor.280
In the context of the T-Mobile-Sprint merger, the biggest efficiency was carrier aggregation. More concentrated carriers can
more effectively deploy a scarce resource, resulting in a better
product for consumers.281 While this degree of consolidation of the
market represents a restraint on trade, the federal agencies and
the courts have determined the procompetitive justification of a
273. See T-Mobile U.S., Inc., 34 FCC Rcd. 10,578, 10,614 (2019) (analyzing Sprint’s viability as a future competitor).
274. New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 439 F. Supp. 3d 179, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
275. Id. at 195.
276. Cf. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489–90 (1977) (holding that a better competitor did not commit an antitrust violation against another competitor).
277. See supra Part I.
278. See supra Part I.
279. See Deutsche Telekom, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 217–18.
280. See supra notes 106–14 and accompanying text.
281. Deutsche Telekom, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 208–09.
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better product is sufficient to outweigh the dangers of the restraint.282 The defense’s argument centered on the need for the
merger-specific efficiencies to effectively implement the new 5G
network.283 Efficiencies such as carrier aggregation and innovation
are difficult to weigh against potential risks to consumers; therefore, this analysis should be limited to the specialized agencies
uniquely equipped to balance the competing interests at stake.
The DOJ and FCC were the best-situated regulators to guide the
transaction for the maximum benefit of the aggregate social welfare due to their expertise and national focus. The plaintiff states’
actions demonstrate a focus on individual motivations—particularly state-level consumer welfare—at the cost of innovation and
national development. The need to focus on rural service is apparent in the FCC’s approval of and stipulations to the T-MobileSprint merger,284 but may be less important to certain states. Similarly, the FCC believed the enhanced 5G technology from the merger would extend benefits “beyond mobile wireless services alone,
to enhance the competitiveness of the United States’ economy.”285
To steer the market towards this goal requires a macroeconomic
view of the economy, not a collection of the states’ local preferences.286 Facilitating this goal is not possible when competing interests (such as collective states) can effectively oppose the coordination of the federal agencies.
Finally, this restriction of collective state action would have
saved years’ worth of time, streamlined the inevitable merger, prevented multiple states from shifting their collective focus from antitrust violations in their state to a national market, and reduced
costs.287 Antitrust is a balance between encouraging competition
and protecting consumers. In telecommunications, the groups best
suited to determine that balance are federal regulators. The settlements and divestitures created by the federal enforcers gave the

282. Statement of Interest, supra note 44, at 5.
283. Defendants’ Pretrial Memorandum, supra note 53, at 21–25.
284. T-Mobile U.S., Inc., 34 FCC Rcd. 10,578 (2019).
285. Id. at 10,582.
286. Waller, supra note 15, at 829 (discussing executive branch decisions that antitrust
goals must be supplanted by broader policy goals).
287. See Posner, supra note 15.
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merging parties the opportunity to reinvigorate competition, create significant efficiencies, and provide a new and better product
to many consumers.
CONCLUSION
While this Comment discusses the issue of collective state antitrust enforcement in the telecommunications industry, its suggestions can be applied to similar federally regulated industries. Competitors in strictly federally regulated markets deal with the
universal costs of compliance inherent in all markets, but additionally must adhere to market-specific restrictions of the federal regulatory scheme. The applicability of this Comment’s suggestions to
similarly regulated industries, such as the airlines and pharmaceutical markets, will need to be covered in a later article.
The telecommunications market is striving towards its next major market innovation while facing substantial novel and preexisting regulatory hurdles. To preserve the innovation necessary for
this market, it may be time to provide regulatory and adjudicative
clarity to the competitors. After negotiations, divestitures, and approval of a transaction, competitors must be able to continue their
business without risk of their transactions being unwound. The
States’ Attorneys General serve as vital checks on federal agencies
and anticompetitive behavior, but should not masquerade as another federal enforcer in telecommunications.
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